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1. INTRODUCTION 
Worldwide, there are approximately 21.3 mill ion refugees,  
nearly half of whom are children. 1 Refugees are often more 
vulnerable to deprivations of health than their citizen 
counterparts in their countries of residence, 2 and typically enjoy 
                                                 
1
 UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. (2016). Figures at a Glance. Retrieved  September 29, 
2016, from: http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html. [Last Accessed June 12, 2017]. 
2
 Hebebrand, J. et al. (2016). A First Assessment Of The Needs Of Young Refugees Arriving 
In Europe: What Mental Health Professionals Need To Know. European Child & Adolescent 
Psychiatry. 25, 1-6; Boise, L. et al. (2013) African Refugee And Immigrant Health Needs: 
Report From A Community-Based House Meeting Project. Progress in Community Health 
Partnerships: Research, Education, and Action. 7, 369-78. 
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more limited entitlements to health care. 3 While it  has been 
argued that all people, including refugees, enjoy a  moral right 
to health and/or health care, 4 many wealthy countries have been 
hesitant to either accommodate refugees  and migrants within 
their borders, or grant them access to the same health care 
services as citizens. 5  
One reason for this hesitancy is the assumed high financial cost  
of accommodating refugees  and migrants and providing them 
with health care, and the fear that doing so will result in a 
reduction in the quali ty and quantity of care available to cit izens  
- considerations which make granting ref uge and entit lements to 
health care to refugees and migrants politically unpopular  (by 
                                                 
3 Castañeda, H. (2009). Illegality As Risk Factor: A Survey Of Unauthorized Migrant Patients 
In A Berlin Clinic. Social Science Medicine. 68. 
4  Wolff, J. (2012) The Human Right to Health. New York, USA: W.W. Norton & Company, 
Inc. 
5
 Dearden, L. (2016). Refugee Crisis: From Border Controls To Cash Seizures, How 
Germany Turned Its Back On Refugees. The Independent. Retrieved July 20, 2016 from: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-germany-turning-its-back-
on-asylum-seekers-with-border-controls-cash-seizures-and-a6829801.html. [Last Accessed 
June 13, 2017]; Bennett, A. (2016). Did Britain Really Vote Brexit To Cut Immigration? The 
Telegraph. Retrieved August 30, 2016 from:  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/29/did-britain-really-vote-brexit-to-cut-
immigration/. [Last Accessed June 12, 2017].  
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which I mean that such actions may not be supported by a 
significant proportion of the electorate,  and may thus endanger 
the political power and longevity of the governm ent which 
enacted them).6 In response, it  has been argued that providing at 
least certain kinds of basic health care to resident refugees and 
migrants is actually in the interests of host nations,  and that the 
benefits  of providing such care outweigh associated costs.7  
This argument from the parochial  interests of host nations has 
been suggested as a valuable discursive strategy for  alleviating 
political concerns about providing health care to refugees and 
migrants,8 and encouraging the provision of care to them. 
                                                 
6 Kymlicka, W. (2015). Solidarity in Diverse Societies: Beyond Neoliberal Multiculturalism 
and Welfare Chauvinism. Comparative Migration Studies 3(1) p.17. 
7 Illingworth, P. & Parmet, W. E. (2015) The Right to Health: Why It Should Apply to 
Immigrants. Public Health Ethics 8(2), 148–61; Widdows, H. & Marway, H. (2015) A Global 
Public Goods Approach to the Health of Migrants. Public Health Ethics 8(2) 121–29. 
8 In this paper I focus mainly on the health needs of refugees, since they are typically more 
vulnerable, and enjoy fewer entitlements than voluntary migrants, who in some countries 
enjoy the same level of access to care as citizens (Rechel, B. et al. (2013). Migration And 
Health In An Increasingly Diverse Europe. Lancet. 381. 1235-45; Hebebrand. et al. op. cit. 
Note 2; Boise. et al. op. cit. Note 2.). However, many of the arguments in favour of providing 
or refusing refugees access to health care apply equally well to the provision (or refusal) of 
health care to migrants. Therefore, for purposes of brevity, while there are differences 
between refugees and migrants, I usually discuss the arguments surrounding their access to 
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However,  despite the significant strategic value of such 
arguments, this approach is limited; it  offers little argument for  
the provision of certain  kinds of care which may be especially 
needed by refugees, and has limited force when applied to the 
needs of refugees who are not resident in wealthy countries . In 
response, I suggest  that  framing the discourse surrounding the 
provision of health care to refugees and migrants in terms of 
solidarity,  rather than self -interest , can compensate for these 
limitations.   
My goal is to address the shortcomings of self-interested 
discourses,  and expand upon existing pragmatic arguments for 
the provision of health care 9 to refugees and migrants . I argue 
that by framing discussions surrounding refugee and migrant 
entit lements to health care in terms of their similarities with the 
citizens of wealthy countries, rather than the interests of such 
citizens,  it  may be possible to motivate the latter  to act  in 
solidarity with the former.  In doing so, I suggest that a discourse 
grounded in solidarity in this way may be one way of motivating 
                                                 
care together, noting differences in their application to each group where necessary. I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this important distinction.   
9 I therefore assume, for the purposes of argument, that there are moral reasons for ensuring 
that refugees and migrants enjoy access to at least basic comprehensive health care, though I 
do not argue for this claim here.  
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wealthy countries and their citizens to support  the delivery of 
health care to refugees and migrants which does not rely so 
heavily on the economic or epidemiological benefits of so doing .  
To achieve this goal ,  I first  outline concerns about the financial  
costs to host countries of granting migrants and refugees access 
to needed health care.  Second, I discuss two criticisms of these 
concerns,  and note their limitations. Having done so, I offer a 
way of overcoming these l imitations, by using the parochial 
interests of wealthy countries as an epistemological catalyst 
which can motivate solidarity with refugees and migrants  –  I 
argue that  health policies based on self-interest implicitly 
acknowledge the existence of important similarities between the 
citizens of wealthy countries,  and refugees and migrants.  By 
acknowledging and emphasizing these similari ties  (shared 
vulnerabilities to certain health threats) , health policy can 
incorporate them into public discourse,  increasing citizen 
knowledge and awareness of their relationships and similarities 
with refugees and migrants.10 Following arguments made 
elsewhere,11 I suggest  that  this increased knowledge can function 
                                                 
10 For this reason it is appropriate to refer to self-interest as an epistemological catalyst in this 
context, as recognition of it, increases or changes knowledge amongst citizens of their 
similarities with non-citizens. 
11 Author 2016. 
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as a starting point  for solidarity between members of these 
seemingly distinct groups.  
2. COMPETING RIGHTS CLAIMS? 12 
The extent of any legal rights to health care enjoyed by migrants 
and refugees is the subject  of lengthy debate, 13 which has grown 
more heated as the ongoing European Refugee Crisis has 
progressed.14 For example, the costs imposed by migrants and 
refugees on destination countries were of high prominence 
during the 2016 British referendum on membership of the 
European Union. 15 Correlatively,  immigration from South 
America to the United States has long been a contentious issue 
in the USA, with some States establishing laws which 
                                                 
12 Importantly, when discussing “rights to health care” I refer only to legal rights typically 
associated with citizenship of a given state, rather than a moral right to health care sometimes 
argued to be associated with the moral status of personhood, the existence of which I do not 
consider in this paper. 
13
  Mladovsky, P. et al. (2012). Responding To Diversity: An Exploratory Study Of Migrant 
Health Policies In Europe. Health Policy. 105. p.1-9; Dauvrin, M. et al. (2012). Health care 
for irregular migrants: pragmatism across Europe. A qualitative study. BMC Research Notes. 
5. p. 1-9. 
14 Dearden. op. cit. Note 5. 
15
 Dorling, D. (2016). Brexit: The Decision Of A Divided Country. British Medical Journal. 
354. p. i3697. 
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deliberately make it  harder for migrants to access health care. 16 
Immigration, in particular from Mexic o and the Middle East , 
also featured heavily in the recent U.S. Presidential  election, 
with now-President Donald Trump campaigning on a strongly 
isolationist and exclusionary platform. 17  
One source of reluctance on the part of destination countries  to 
extend citizen-entitlements to health care to refugees and 
migrants is  that  it  is  feared that  doing so will  adversely impact 
the supposedly prior enti tlements of their vulnerable citizens .  
Will Kymlicka describes this concern  as the ‘progressive’s 
dilemma’ ,18 and argues that there is a tension between two 
important commitments of progressive cosmopolitanism; first, 
                                                 
16 Chavez, L. (2013). The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation 
(Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press); White, K. et al., (2014) Impact of Alabama’s 
Immigration Law on Access to Health Care Among Latina Immigrants and Children: 
Implications for National Reform. American Journal of Public Health. 104(3) p.397–405. 
17 Ross, J. (2016). From Mexican Rapists to Bad Hombres, the Trump Campaign in Two 
Moments. Washington Post, Retrieved on October 20, 2016, from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/20/from-mexican-rapists-to-
bad-hombres-the-trump-campaign-in-two-moments/. [Last Accessed June 24, 2017]; Gallup 
Incorporated. (2015). One in Five Voters Say Immigration Stance Critical to Vote. 
Gallup.com. Retrieved September 9, 2015, from  
http://www.gallup.com/poll/185381/one-five-voters-say-immigration-stance-critical-
vote.aspx. [Last Accessed June 17, 2017]. 
18 Kymlicka. op cit. Note 6. 
8 
 
to fulfil the moral rights of migrants and refugees to health care 
and freedom of movement. Second, to ensure that vulnerable 
people within destination countries retain their own entitlements 
to important welfare services. These commitments are possibly 
in conflict  with each other due to the additional strain that  may 
be placed on finite welfare systems by sudden increases in 
resident populations caused by mass migration or claims of 
refuge. Here, there is  a concern that the health and welfare needs 
of migrants, refugees, and cit izens are engaged in a zero -sum 
game in which for one to benefit,  another must lose out. 19 For 
example,  concerns that allowing migrants to access publicly 
funded health care systems will lead to excessive costs, or to an 
influx of ‘illegal or unproductive migrants’  seeking to take 
advantage of an ‘overgenerous’  system has contributed to health 
care policy making in countries like Australia and the USA. 20  
Based on similar concerns,  there is  reluctance on the part of 
countries like the United Kingdom to admit large numbers of 
                                                 
19 Widdows & Marway. op. cit. Note 7; Dustmann, C. & Preston, I. (2007) Racial and 
Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & 
Policy 7(1). P.26. 
20
 Illingworth & Parmet. op. cit. Note 7; Reuters & Palazzo, C. (2016). Australia Sees Abuse 
In Nauru Migrant Camp As Deterrent, Say Human Rights Groups. The Telegraph.  Retrieved 
September 19, 2016, from  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/02/australia-sees-
abuse-in-nauru-migrant-camp-as-deterrent-say-huma/.[Last Accessed June 15, 2017].  
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refugees and migrants, or to grant them automatic,  or 
unconditional rights to the same health care services  enjoyed by 
citizens.  For example,  certain categories of migrant to the U .K. 
must pay an additional ‘Health Surcharge ’  in addition to any 
taxes paid by the migrant, which  is  intended to ‘offset’  any 
additional costs imposed by them on the British National Health 
Service (NHS). 21 However, there is  little evidence that granting 
refugees and migrants automatic access to health and welfare 
services actually contributes to migration 22 –  ‘push factors’, 
such as a conflict and instability in exit countries, and the desire 
for economic advancement appear to be the primary drivers of 
migration.23 Though i t should be noted that  while generous 
                                                 
21
 H.M. Government of the United Kingdom. (2016). Pay for UK healthcare as part of your 
immigration application. Retrieved September 15, 2016, from:  
https://www.gov.uk/healthcare-immigration-application/overview [Last Accessed May 19, 
2017]. 
22 International Organization for Migration. (2013). World Migration Report 2013. Geneva, 
Switzerland: International Organization for Migration. p.33-34; Illingworth & Parmet, op. 
cit., note 7, p.150; Rechel et al., op. cit., note 8. 
23 Pedersen, P. J., Pytlikova, M. & Smith, N. (2008). Selection and Network effects—
Migration Flows into OECD Countries 1990–2000. European Economic Review. 52(7). 
p.1180; Handlos, L. N., Kristiansen, M. & Norredam, M. (2015). Wellbeing or Welfare 
Benefits—What Are The Drivers for Migration?, Scandinavian Journal of Social Medicine. 
44(2); Squire, V. et al. (2017) Crossing the Mediterranean Sea By Boat: Mapping and 
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public health and welfare may not drive migration per se ,  it  is  
plausible that  they may encourage refugees and migrants to seek 
accommodation in one particular destination country rather than 
another.24  
3. TWO POSSIBLE RESPONSES 
In response to these concerns,  two arguments can be made, each 
derived from the benefits conferred on destination countries by 
immigration. First, resident migrants and refugees often confer 
significant economic benefits on their new countries of 
residence, and contribute to the delivery of important health care 
services in those countries. 25 Second, the provision of health 
care for certain conditions to migrants and refugees contributes 
to the control of a range of health threats to which citizens are 
also vulnerable. Consequently,  guaranteeing migrants and 
resident refugees rights to health care (of at least certain kinds) 
is in the epidemiological interest of their new countries of 
residence. It  has been argued therefore that framing the 
                                                 
Documenting Migratory Journeys and Experiences Final Project Report. Warwick, UK: The 
University of Warwick. 
24 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this important point.  
25 Simpson, J. M. et al. (2010). Writing Migrants Back into NHS History: Addressing a 




discourse surrounding refugee entitlements to health care in 
terms of the benefits that  doing so provides to their countries of 
residence, can be an effective strategy for motivating wealthy 
countries and their citizens to support  the provision of health 
care to refugees and migrants.  In this section, I set out these 
arguments,  before exploring their limitations,  and suggesting a 
way to expand their scope  further in order to justify extending 
legal rights to health care to all  migrants and refugees.   
3.1 The economic benefits of migrants and refugees to 
destination countries  
First, it  has been shown that migrants and refugees often confer 
significant economic benefits on their countries of residence, 
either through direct tax contributions, or by indirectly 
stimulating local  economies through consumer spending and 
investment in business. This can be i llustrated with three 
examples;  first, in the United  States of America,  immigrants 
‘contributed an estimated US$115.2 Bill ion more to the 
Medicare Trust Fund than they took out in 2002 -09’.26 Medicare 
                                                 
26
 Zallman, L.  et al. (2013) Immigrants Contributed An Estimated $115.2 Billion More To 
The Medicare Trust Fund Than They Took Out In 2002–09. Health Affairs. 32. p.1153-60. 
It should be noted that only those migrants with permanent residency or citizenship status 
(and who are therefore entitled to work in the USA), are entitled to access Medicare services, 
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is the U.S. federal  health insurance programme which provides 
insurance coverage to people aged 65 and over,  and those with 
certain kinds of disabili ties. 27 It  is a system which is funded 
through taxation, and which thus may be seen as vulnerable to 
incurring additional costs as a result  of migration. However,  the 
noted figures demonstrate that  migrants in fact  contribute more 
to this system than they take out, thereby benefiting non -migrant 
enrolees.  An example of a more direct contribution made by 
migrants to the health care systems of their host countries can 
be found in the United Kingdom; a 2005 study found that  in 
2003, 29.4% of doctors working in the British NHS, and 43.5% 
of nurses recruited since 1999 were born overseas. 28  
 
                                                 
meaning that the group of migrants to which this data refers may be smaller than the total 
number of migrants in the USA overall.  
27
 Medicare.Gov. (2016). What’s Medicare?. Retrieved April 12, 2017, from 
https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-
medicare/what-is-medicare.html. [Last Accessed June 20, 2017]. 
28 Sriskandarajah, D., Cooley, L. & Reed, H. (2005). Paying Their Way: The Fiscal 
Contribution of Immigrants in the UK. London, UK: Institute for Public Policy Research; 
Johnson, M. R. D. & Mcgee, P. (2005). Globalising Care. Diversity in Health and Social 
Care. 2. p.1. 
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Second, a recent study on immigration to the United Kingdom 
found that since 2000, immigrants have had a positive impact on 
the British economy. 29 This study found that between 2001 and 
2011 immigrants to the UK contributed roughly £20 billion more 
to the British economy than they received from it . 30 In addition, 
immigration to the UK by highly educated persons effectively 
saved the UK approximately £18 billion, because the costs of 
teaching these migrants were borne by their exit countries. 31  
Third, i t  has also been noted that as a result of demographic 
shifts,  countries like the UK and Germany are increasingly 
reliant on immigration to maintain their economies  in the face 
of demographic change .32 The combination of ageing 
populations 33 with declining birthrates 34 in most wealthy 
                                                 
29 Dustmann, C. & Frattini, T. (2014). The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK. The 
Economic Journal. 124(580). pp. F593-F643, F593 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Rechel, et al. op. cit., note 8: 1235. 
33 Bijak, J. et al. (2007). Population and Labour Force Projections for 27 European Countries, 
2002-052: Impact of International Migration on Population Ageing. European Journal of 
Population / Revue Européenne de Démographie 23(1). p.27; Bloom, D. E., Canning, D. & 
Fink, G. (2010). Implications of Population Ageing for Economic Growth. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 26(4). p.583. 
34 Rechel, et al. op. cit., note 8, p.1235. 
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European countries  is predicted to reduce the number of persons 
able to participate in the work force. This reduction in the 
working population is also predicted to thereby reduce the 
amount of tax funding available to pay for the health and welfare 
needs of an ageing population. Consequently,  “ Europe needs 
migrants”35 i f it  is  to provide for the increasingly expensive 
welfare needs of its ageing population.   
It  should be acknowledged there are costs associated with 
enabling resident refugees to participate in the economies of 
their host  nation which reduce the benefits they can deliver in 
the short  term. However,  it  has been shown that  when destination 
countries empower refugees to participate in local  economies, 
through the provision of language training and health care for 
instance, refugees make significant fiscal contributions to the 
economies of their  new destination countries. 36  
Correlatively, a study conducted on the provision of care to 
refugees in Germany 37 found that  denying refugees access to 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Legrain, P. (2016). Refugees Work: A Humanitarian Investment that Yields Economic 
Dividends. New York City, USA: The Tent Foundation. P.7. 
37 It is possible that this outcome is specific to the German context (just as the other examples 
in this section could be each specific to the countries from which they are taken) and may not 
be replicated in other wealthy countries. However, these examples were chosen from a range 
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health care, or strict ly limiting which kinds of health care they 
may access, was more costly than allowing unrestricted access. 38 
Additional costs were ascribed to a number of factors,  including 
‘delayed care, focus on treatment of acute conditions instead of 
prevention and health promotion, reliance on expert  opinion of 
public health officials on decisions whether treatments are 
“medically indicated”…, and higher administrative costs 
entailed by the restrictive parallel system with its own funding, 
purchasing, and re-imbursement schemes’. 39 While these costs 
                                                 
of countries as they indicate a sample of the ways in which migrants and refugees have 
contributed to their countries of residence. Further, the range of countries listed indicate that 
the benefits generated by refugees and migrants are not restricted to one country with unique 
features. However, it should be noted that poorer countries who receive large numbers of 
refugees and migrants may not receive the same benefits as wealthier countries, and may 
rather incur significant costs as a result of immigration and the provision of refuge. As I 
discuss in section five, poorer countries may lack the resources needed to promote citizen 
welfare, much less make the initial investment in refugee welfare which may be necessary to 
enable refugees to participate effectively in local economies, and thus confer benefits on their 
new countries of residence. Consequently, it is necessary to move beyond mere self-interest 
as the sole motivation for the provision of health care assistance to refugees, since many 
refugees live in places where those with the power to help them lack self-interested reasons 
to do so.   
38 Bozorgmehr, K. & Razum, O. (2015). Effect of Restricting Access to Health Care on 
Health Expenditures Among Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: A Quasi-Experimental Study in 
Germany, 1994–2013. PloS One. 10. 
39 Ibid: 19 
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may be avoided by refusing to accommodate legal refugees,  this 
would also forgo the longer term economic benefits  they bring.  
3.2 Epidemiological Arguments for the Provision of Health Care 
to Migrants and Refugees  
A second argument based on the interest of destination countries 
and their citizens for granting migrants and refugees rights to 
health care can be derived from the public health benefits of 
ensuring universal access to certain kinds of care. This public 
health, or ‘epidemiological’ ,  argument for the provision of 
health care, at least for infectious diseases,  is justified on the 
grounds that  many of the goods, infrastructures,  and services 
needed to promote and protect  health , such as public sanitation 
and sewerage, or herd immunity qualify as ‘public’  goods.40 
Public goods typically display three main features; first, they 
are ‘non-excludable’, 41 meaning that when established no 
persons within their reach can be prevented from enjoying the 
benefits  associated with the good. Second, they are ‘jointly 
produced’,42 meaning that they are the product of the aggregated 
                                                 
40 Widdows & Marway op. cit., note 7; Illingworth & Parmet, op. cit., note 7. 
41
 Waldron, J. (1987). Can Communal Goods be Human Rights? Archives Europeennes De 
Sociologie. European Journal of Sociology. Europaisches Archiv Fur Soziologie. 28. pp. 
296-322, p.304. 
42 Ibid: 304. 
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actions of all ,  or most, members of  the public in question. Third,  
public goods are ‘non -rivalrous’,43 meaning that  one person’s 
use or enjoyment of a given good does not prevent other people 
from using or enjoying the same good concurrently.  
Of the three features of public goods, the most r elevant for the 
epidemiological  argument is the jointness of production 
condition –  the feature of public goods which means that  they 
can only be established, delivered and maintained through mass 
participation by all or most group members. 44 Importantly,  where 
many public goods rely only on the actions or behaviours  of 
individual persons –  the fact  that  human persons are both 
potential ‘victims and vectors’ of infectious disease means that  
the effective delivery of environments in which the threat  of 
infectious disease is  controlled is also partly dependent on the 
health states of individual group members. 45 That is, the health 
of any given person can be affected by the health states of other 
people –  vulnerabili ty to tuberculosis is  closely related to the 
number of one’s co-nationals who are already affected by the 
                                                 
43 Kaul, I. Grunberg, I. & Stern, M.A. (1999). Defining Global Public Goods. In: I. Kaul, I. 
Grunberg & M.A. Stern., (Ed.), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st 
Century. (pp. 2-19: 2). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.. 
44 AUTHOR 2013. 
45 Battin, M.P. et al. (2009). The Patient as Victim and Vector: Ethics and Infectious Disease. 
New York, USA: Oxford University Press. 
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disease for example. 46 Each individual’s immunity to a vaccine 
preventable disease for example thus contributes to herd 
immunity,  and the broader good of a “healthful environment”. 47 
The impact of individual health states on the health of other 
persons is therefore the source of at least one reason to provide 
universal access to certain kinds of health care  - the presence in 
society of large numbers of people who are immune to,  and thus 
not carriers of,  infectious diseases reduces the general  risk of 
infection in a given population and contributes to the public 
good which has been described elsewhere as a “healthful 
environment” .48 The particular vulnerability of refugees, noted 
above, therefore provides strong self -interested reasons for host 
nations to ensure that they have access to at  least basic essential  
services. The relational nature of health,  and the public nature 
of the goods required to protect and preserve i t mean that  
adequate prevention of disease outbreaks within the borders of 
wealthy countries rel ies on ensuring that all persons within those 
                                                 
46 Farmer, P. (1999). Infections and Inequalities: The Modern Plagues. Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press. pp. 230-231. 
47 Author op. cit. Note 11. 
48 For purposes of brevity I shall not provide a detailed definition of a healthful environment 
here, but it can loosely be described as an environment in which major threats to health are 
controlled, and which promotes and protects individual health. For a more detailed 
explanation see (Author, op. cit. note 11. p. 1). 
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borders have access to at  least  certain kinds of health care 
services - doing so is necessary to preserve the “healthful 
environment” which reduces the risk of deprivations of health  
faced by cit izens.49  
This type of epidemiological  argument focuses on risks that  
people with infectious disease pose to their compatriots, 50 and 
the need to ensure that  al l persons within a given community be 
protected from infectious disease in order to prevent the 
emergence of ‘reservoirs’ of infection, from which outbreaks of 
disease can spread. 51 This kind of argument is  typically thought 
to offer li ttle justification for the provision of health care for 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs) or injuries. 52 There may be 
little epidemiological  argument for providing refugees and 
                                                 
49 Widdows & Marway op. cit., note 7. 
50 It may be objected that an alternative response would be for destination countries to merely 
refuse entry to potential migrants and refugees, thus removing the need to include them in 
public health activities. This position is similar to the problem I discuss in more detail below, 
of justifying the provision of comprehensive health care to non-resident migrants and 
refugees, and is a limitation of arguments based entirely on the interests of wealthy countries. 
For a discussion of the problematic issues of “epidemiological securitisation”, national 
boundaries, and global health see (Flahault, A. et al. (2016). From Global Health Security To 
Global Health Solidarity, Security And Sustainability. Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization, 94. p. 863) 
51 Battin et al. op. cit., note 48. p. 20. 
52 Widdows & Marway op. cit., note 7. p. 126. 
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migrants access to care for psychiatric issues for instance. 53 
However,  it  has been argued that  seemingly non-communicable  
health conditions can in fact  have an impact on the health states 
of other people, and that providing care for such health states 
should be seen as a way of protecting citizens from such impacts.   
Drawing on empirical research by Christakis and Fowler ,54 
Il lingworth and Parmet note that  a wide range of health states 
which are typically thought to be non -communicable,  such as 
diabetes and obesity,  tend to ‘c luster’ in social demographics .55 
From these findings  it  is  suggested that  health states such as 
obesity and diabetes are argued to have an impact on the health 
of other persons within a community.56 Ill ingworth and Parmet 
thus argue that i t  is in the interests of destination countries to 
grant migrants access to health care even for those health 
conditions which have not traditionally been viewed as 
communicable. 57 Doing so, it  is  argued, will protect  citizens 
from the threat posed by non-communicable disease,  in a similar  
manner as providing vaccination cover age to migrants and 
                                                 
53 Hebebrand et al. op. cit. Note 2. 
54 Christakis, N.A. & Fowler, J.H. (2009). Connected: The surprising power of our social 
networks and how they shape our lives: London, UK: Little, Brown. 
55 Illingworth & Parmet op. cit., note 7: 153. 
56 Ibid: 153. 
57 Ibid: 153-155. 
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refugees will protect citizens from the threat of infectious 
disease.   
4. THE LIMITATIONS OF SELF-INTEREST  
The arguments presented in the previous section provide  
justifications for the provision of certain kinds of care to some 
migrant and refugees. However,  these arguments retain 
significant limitations; first,  it  is unclear that Illingworth and 
Parmet’s argument can offer an epidemiological justification for 
the provision of certain important health care services to 
refugees and migrants.  To il lustrate , psychiatric conditions, 
such as post-traumatic stress disorder (which are arguably more 
likely to be experienced by refugees than conditions like 
obesity) may not  be accounted for by this argument .58 Where 
obesity is highly socially determined within wealthy countries, 
and can be addressed by public responses (dietary education, 
safe areas to exercise etc.), mental health issues often demand a 
                                                 
58 Goodkind, J. R. et al. (2014). Reducing Refugee Mental Health Disparities: A Community-
Based Intervention To Address Postmigration Stressors With African Adults. Psychological 
Services. 11(3). p. 333; Hebebrand et al. op. cit. Note 2. 
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more personalized therapeutic approach , which may not confer 
health benefits to those beyond targeted populations .59  
Further,  although there is significant st igma surrounding mental 
illness, and a corresponding fear that  people with mental  
illnesses pose an increased threat  to others,  data suggest  that  
mental  illness is a “weak risk factor” for violence ,  further 
undermining the epidemiological argument for the provision of 
mental  health treatment to refugees .60 Consequently,  Illingworth 
and Parmet’s argument may not be as appropriate for some 
important health deprivations commonly faced by refugees , 
since they may not pose a risk to cit izens and other third 
parties.61 However, as discussed above, such provision to at least 
                                                 
59 Fazel, M. et al. (2012). Mental Health of Displaced and Refugee Children Resettled in 
High-Income Countries: Risk and Protective Factors. The Lancet. 379(9812). pp.266–82; 
Betancourt, T. S. et al. (2015). Addressing Health Disparities in the Mental Health of Refugee 
Children and Adolescents Through Community-Based Participatory Research: A Study in 2 
Communities. American Journal of Public Health. 105(S3). pp.S475–82. 
60 Rozel, J. S. & Edward P. Mulvey, (2017) “The Link Between Mental Illness and Firearm 
Violence: Implications for Social Policy and Clinical Practice,” Annual Review of Clinical 
Psychology 13(1): 445, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-021815-093459; Time to 
Change, MIND, and Rethink Mental Illness, “Violence & Mental Health,” Time To Change, 
June 11, 2012, https://www.time-to-change.org.uk/media-centre/responsible-
reporting/violence-mental-health-problems. 
61
 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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some migrants and refugees can be defended on economic 
grounds, though many others will  still  be excluded .62   
Second, arguments from the interests of wealthy nations also 
implicitly endorse the retention of harmful distinctions between 
refugees and migrants and the cit izens of destination countries 
–  they deliberately emphasise that  it  is  in ‘our’ interest to 
provide care to ‘them’. 63 While this is done for sound pragmatic 
reasons, endorsing the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’, 64 
these arguments allow for the retention of barriers which allow 
‘us’ to exclude ‘them’ from more comprehensive health care 
services,  o r even residency, if doing so is  in ‘our’ immediate 
interests. Emphasising the interests of host nations risks 
stigmatising refugees and migrants as possible sources of 
                                                 
62 Zallman, op. cit., note 26; Dustmann & Frattini op. cit., note 31: F628-F629. It should be 
noted that some poorer states may lack the resources to make the initial investment, discussed 
above, needed for refugees to make such contributions, and may thus require assistance from 
wealthy countries (Rawlence, B. (2016). City of Thorns: Nine Lives in the World's Largest 
Refugee Camp. Croydon, UK: Portobello Books. Pp. 1-3). I discuss this point in more detail 
below. 
63 Flahault A. et al., (2016) “From Global Health Security To Global Health Solidarity, 
Security And Sustainability,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 94: 863, 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.16.171488. 




infection,65 because doing so requires that we first  show that 
there are health risks associated with vulnerable and under -
treated resident populations in order to show the value of 
providing them with treatment. This may potentially lead to 
more  exclusionary immigration policy, in an attempt to avoid 
the need to incur the costs and risks associated with providing 
health care services in the first place. 66  
Correlatively, these arguments are not able to justify the 
provision of a comprehensive set  of health care services to those 
refugees and migrants who are not resident in nations with the 
resources to make the required init ial  investment in their health. 
What is needed to motivate wealthy countries and their citizens 
to support the provision of more comprehensive health care to 
migrants and refugees,  is a way to move beyond pure self -
interest and remove the psychological barriers which exclude 
certain persons from our solidary groups. 67   
                                                 
65 Flahault et al. op. cit. note 66, p.863 
66 Correlatively, as I discuss below, arguments from the parochial interests of wealthy 
countries are of only limited force when applied to the health needs of non-resident refugees 
(Rawlence op. cit. note 65). 
67 This idea has been discussed more broadly in terms of global, rather than refugee, health 
previously (AUTHOR op. cit. note 11). Similarly, Christine Straehle has suggested that 
recognition of vulnerability, and the desire to remove it, is foundational to domestic welfare 
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In the rest of this paper I explain how, despite the limitations of  
arguments derived from self -interest,  they may be able to 
provide a valuable foundation for a solidarity based discourse 
about migrant and refugee health, which could motivate wealthy 
countries and their citizens 68 to support the extension of legal 
rights to health care to refugees and migrants.  
5. MOVING BEYOND SELF-INTEREST –  MOTIVATING 
SOLIDARITY FOR REFUGEE HEALTH 
                                                 
state programmes, and that this may be extrapolated to the global stage (Lenard, P. T., 
Straehle, C. & Lea Ypi, (2010) “Global Solidarity,” Contemporary Political Theory 9 (1): 
118). As discussed in more detail below, a desire to challenge and ameliorate (shared) 
vulnerabilities is central to my argument for the provision of health care to refugees and 
migrants. A technical discussion of the psychological foundations of solidarity is beyond the 
scope of the philosophical claims of this paper. However, for a detailed discussion of cases 
in which solidarity has transcended national groups, and empirical psychological research 
into such transcendence, see (Burgoon et al. op. cit. Note 39; Vollhardt, J. R., Nair, R., & 
Tropp, L. R. (2016). Inclusive Victim Consciousness Predicts Minority Group Members’ 
Support for Refugees and Immigrants. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 46 (6), pp.354–
68).  
68 It has also been suggested that, initially at least, it may only be necessary to convince a 
small number of citizens of wealthy countries to recognise solidarity with migrants and 
refugees. This minority may then act as a “cosmopolitan avant-garde” which seeks to 
gradually convince a larger and larger proportion of their society to expand national 
“solidarity’s boundaries” (Lenard et al.,  op. Cit. Note 70: 124). 
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In this section I define the concept of solidarity,  and explain 
how it can be derived from self -interest and used to shape the 
discourse surrounding refugee and migrant entitlements to 
health care. I show how such a solidaristic discourse may have 
significant value in motivating action in response to the health 
needs of refugees and migrants. Importantly, my goal is not to 
supplant self-interest  as a discursive strategy on this issue, since 
it has significant util ity in certain contexts, but rather to expand 
upon it .  Doing so provides an additional way of motivating 
action for refugee and migrant health in contexts in which pure 
self-interest  alone is insufficient.  
Solidarity has been defined in a wide variety of ways ; as a 
unifying feature of religious,  cultural, or national groups ,69 a 
motivational precondition for the fulfil lment of the demands of 
justice,70 the act  of ‘“standing up for”, “standing up with”, and  
“standing up as”’ other persons, 71 and as the ‘enacted 
commitment to carry “costs” (financial ,  social,  emotional,  or 
                                                 
69 Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press: 192. 
70 Krishnamurthy, M. (2013). Political Solidarity, Justice and Public Health. Public Health 
Ethics. 6. pp.129-41: 133; Scholz, S. J. (2008). Political Solidarity. Pennsylvania, USA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press: 78. 
71 Jennings, B. & Dawson, A. (2015). Solidarity in the Moral Imagination of Bioethics. 
Hastings Cent Report. 45. pp.31-8: 35. 
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otherwise) to assist  others with whom a person or persons 
recognise s imilarity in a relevant respect’ .72 It  is this final 
definit ion of solidarity upon which I shall base my arg ument in 
this paper –  that self-interest  can ground a solidarity focused 
discourse which can  motivate action for refugee health .73  
Two prominent features emerge from the various definitions of 
solidarity; first, it  is an active concept,  which entails willing 
engagement with the needs of other persons  –  it  is  something we 
                                                 
72 Prainsack, B. & Buyx, A. (2017). Solidarity in Biomedicine and Beyond. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. For further discussions of solidarity see also: Dean, J. (1996). 
Solidarity of Strangers: Feminism After Identity Politics. Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press; Young, I.M. (2002). Inclusion and Democracy. New York, USA: Oxford 
University Press; Gould, C.C. (2014). Interactive Democracy: The Social Roots of Global 
Justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
73 Importantly, because what counts as a “relevant similarity” can be very broad, solidarity 
can be self-interested, or based on expectations of reciprocity. For example, Susan’s 
solidaristic cooperation with Lisa may be based on her recognition of their shared interest in 
achieving a common objective - Susan recognises that they are similar in their desire for that 
objective, and she is willing to incur the costs of helping Lisa achieve it as well because doing 
so will benefit her, and she expects Lisa to incur proportionally similar costs to support their 
mutual objective. Here, Susan and Lisa’s cooperation is self-interested and reciprocal, but is 
also solidaristic, since they each incur costs to benefit someone with whom they share 
relevant similarities in pursuit of a shared and otherwise unobtainable objective. In my 
discussion of antimicrobial resistance below, I elaborate on this point, and distinguish purely 
self-interested actions from self-interested, yet solidaristic actions. 
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do ,  not something we (merely) feel .  Second, the willingness to 
act on behalf of other persons is derived from recognition of 
similarity with those other persons –  one ‘stands up as’, 74 or 
‘recognise[s] similarity’ 75 with the persons with whom one acts 
in solidarity.  These relevant similarities can be recognised in 
stable features of persons, such as  membership of religious,  
cultural ,  or national  groups,76 but can also be found in temporary  
or transient similarities, such as shared inconvenience as a result 
of a delayed flight. 77 It  is this emphasis on similarity which is 
most important for my argument in this paper,  and which enables 
the move from the self-interested arguments for the provision of 
limited health care to certain migrants and refugees, to a 
broader, solidaristic mot ivation for providing refugees and 
migrants with comprehensive health care.  
Solidarity is action by an agent for the benefit  of another,  
motivated by recognition of  relevant similarities between them. 
Acknowledging that  it  is  in one’s interest s to provide treatment 
for a specific disease to distant others (or to resident migrants 
                                                 
74 Jennings & Dawson, op. cit., note 74: 35. 
75 Prainsack & Buyx, op. cit., note 75. 
76 Rorty, op. cit., note 72: 192. 
77 Prainsack, B. & Buyx, A. (2011). Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in 
Bioethics. Swindon, UK: Nuffield Council on Bioethics: xiv. 
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or refugees),  is to implicitly acknowledge that that disease is  
also a threat  to oneself and one’s compatriots,  and to thus 
recognise an important point  of similari ty between onese lf and 
other persons. It can thus act as an epistemological catalyst for 
the cit izens of wealthy countries to become aware of the ways 
in which they are similar to vulnerable non -citizens. This 
awareness can challenge those ‘assumptions of distance and 
difference’78 which would otherwise encourage residents of 
wealthy countries to overlook the health needs of distant 
refugees.  Framing public discourse in terms of similarity,  rather 
than self-interest  (which is typically exclusionary and 
distancing) can change the way citizens view refugees and 
migrants, and thus encourage them to engage in solidarity for 
the benefit of the vulnerable , as I explain in more detail below.   
This emphasis on similarity means that a solidari stic discourse 
will avoid, or at  least  minimise, the stigma and distancing 
problems associated with purely self-interested discourses noted 
above. Recognising relevant similarit ies with someone outside 
of our traditional solidary group reduces,  or even removes,  one 
reason to view them as an outsider, and reinforces our reasons 
for thinking of them as a member of our solidary group.79 In this 
                                                 
78 Author, op. cit. Note 11. P. 6.  
79 Widdows, op. cit. Note 67. 
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way, emphasising similarity and solidarity in certain discourse 
contexts can ameliorate certain problems associated with se lf-
interest  as a foundation for action for refugee health , and 
function as the basis for an effective political discourse 
surrounding refugee and migrant health  
To illustrate,  the emergence of anti -microbial resistance (AMR) 
has exposed the citizens of wealthy countries to vulnerabilities 
not experienced since the advent of the antibiotic era. 80 In doing 
so, it  has demonstrated an important area of similarity 
(vulnerabil ity to infectious disease) between citizens of wealthy 
countries, who had previously enjo yed the security provided by 
access to antibiotics, and citizens of poor countries, for whom 
infection was often synonymous with death .81 Responses to the 
emergence of AMR have emphasised the need for cooperation 
between countries, and for wealthy countries  to incur costs in 
order to benefit all  persons. 82 Here, solidaristic cooperation 
emerged as a way to protect the interests of wealthy countries. 
This is shown by the emphasis in  a recent report by the Brit ish 
                                                 
80 Littmann, J. & Viens, A.M. (2015). The Ethical Significance of Antimicrobial Resistance. 
Public Health Ethics. 8(3). Pp.209-224. 
81 AUTHOR, op. cit., note 11. 
82 The Review of Antimicrobial Resistance Chaired by Jim O'Neill. Antimicrobial 
Resistance: Tackling A Crisis For The Health And Wealth Of Nations. London, UK: Her 
Majesty's Government, and The Wellcome Trust; 2014. 
31 
 
government on the shared vulnerability of the c itizens of rich 
and poor countries, and the importance of collaborative efforts  
between rich and poor countries as the only  effective way to 
address the risks of AMR.83  
This example provides a useful  illustration of Ypi’s concept of 
a cosmopolitan avant-garde –  a minority group within a political  
community,  whose recognition of , and advocacy for,  particular 
cosmopolitan principles encourages  meaningful change within 
their wider political community. 84 Here,  we may describe those 
responsible for facilitating change within their political  
communities as being an epidemiological , cosmopolitan avant -
garde. Their recognition of the shared vulnerability and risk 
associated with the threat of AMR, while arguably grounded in 
self-interest , led to policy recommendations which were 
characterised by cosmopolitan , rather than nationalist,  
solidarity.   
In this case,  the initial motivation for the authors of the report  
was the promotion of their nation’s  interests, and the protection 
of their residents from serious threats to health.  However,  the 
                                                 
83 Ibid. P.16. 
84 Lenard et. Al., op. Cit. Note 70; Ypi, L. (2011) “A Cosmopolitan Avant-Garde,” in Global 




recommendations for AMR contained in the O’Neill report, 
though certainly self-interested, also emphasised an overt  
willingness to incur costs to meet  the needs and interests of 
persons outside of the group with which wealthy nations were 
initially concerned , based on recognition of their shared 
vulnerabilities .  Here,  engagement with particular hazards for the 
promotion of national or regional interests provided th e catalyst 
for the commitment to incur costs to benefit those with whom 
the shared vulnerabili ty was recognised .85 Self-interest 
identified a point of relevant similarity between the citizens of 
rich and poor countries,  and motivated a solidaristic policy 
response.  
This example refers to a shift in national policy for  global health 
which extends beyond the particular needs of refugees and 
migrants.  I refer to it  here because it  demonstrates that  solidarity 
–  the active engagement with the needs of other persons, based 
on the recognition of similarity –  can be engendered between the 
residents of wealthy nations, and vulnerable yet  distant persons.  
It  thus provides a blueprint indicating how solidarity can be 
generated between the citizens of wealth y countries and non-
                                                 
85 Author, op. Cit. Note 11. 
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resident  refugees,  a group to whom arguments from self -interest  
may have limited applicability.   
Many refugees are resident in countries which lack the ability to 
provide health care to them (or even to citizens).  For example,  
the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, which was originally 
constructed to accommodate 90,000 people, now houses as many 
as half a million refugees. 86 The absence of large scale health 
infrastructure, combined with ongoing regional conflict  and the 
limited resources of the Kenyan state mean that  refugees living 
in Dadaab are unlikely to be the beneficiaries of the investment 
necessary to enable them to contribute more fully to the Kenyan, 
or global economy,  since the Kenyan state may lack the 
resources to make such an investment .87  
This problem is compounded by the fact  that  wealthier countries 
may also lack significant epidemiological  incentives to provide 
care for non-communicable disease to those not within their 
borders –  high rates of cancer amongst marginalized refugees in 
distant countries do not pose a threat to public health in rich 
countries for example. Correlatively,  while there are some 
global economic benefits  to providing health care to distant 
                                                 
86 Rawlence, op. Cit. Note 65. P.2. 
87 Ibid. Pp.39-40. 
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refugees,88 such benefits are less obvious,  and thus harder to 
justify polit ically,  than the provision of care to resident refugees 
–  particularly when fulfilling domestic health care needs will 
deliver more obvious or immediate economic and health benefits 
to the electorates of wealthy countries.   
However,  as discussed above, self-interest can provide the 
catalyst for solidaristic engagement by wealth y countries with 
the broader needs of distant,  vulnerable refugees who would be 
excluded under a viewpoint focusing entirely on self -interest. 
Consequently,  while the non-communicable health states of 
distant refugees may not in themselves motivate wealthy nations 
to act for distant refugees, concerns about  global health more 
generally provide  self-interested reasons to engage with certain 
narrow health needs of distant persons . This initial engagement 
can highlight an important point of similarity between the 
citizens of wealthy nations and distant refugees .  Framing public 
discourse in terms of this similarity enables citizens to recognise 
their relationships and similarities with vulnerable, distant 
others, and may thus empower and encourage them to engage in 
solidarity with those others  in a more comprehensive way than 
a discourse grounded in self -interest alone. Correlatively,  it  can 
be argued that  through engagement with nearby refugees,  




citizens of wealthy countries may acquire increased awareness 
of the needs of refugees  more general ly,  and their status as 
individual persons,  rather than as abstract or anonymous 
statistics,  which may help them to recognise even distant 
refugees in a similar fashion, and be more willing to engage in 
solidarity with them.  
This may appear overly optimistic.  However,  contact between 
members of distinct  social  groups,  such as citizens and refugees,  
has been found to lead to more posit ive attitudes towards,  and 
identification with,  members of vulnerable or marginalised 
groups.89 For example,  it  was reported in early 2018 that a senior 
member of the German far-right (and Islamophobic, anti -
immigration) political party Alternative für Deutschland (AFD), 
had converted to Islam and resigned his membership of the party 
following extensive volunteer work with Muslim refugees in 
Germany. 90 Correlatively,  (though less dramatically) it  has been 
argued that the involvement of migrant workers in the health 
                                                 
89 Paluck, E.L., Green, S. & Green, D. P. (2017) “The Contact Hypothesis Reevaluated,” 
SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2973474. 
90 Williams, J. (January 24, 2018 ) “A Prominent Member of Germany’s Far-Right Anti-
Islam Party Just Converted to Islam,” Vox,  
https://www.vox.com/2018/1/24/16927978/germany-far-right-party-afd-islam-convert-
arthur-wagner. [Last accessed 25 February 2018]. 
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care systems of their new countries of residence can function as 
an additional basis for solidarity.  That is, their professional 
involvement in the health services of their countries of residence 
provides their co-workers with opportunities to meet, interact 
with,  and thus develop relationships with migrants who might 
initially be excluded from membersh ip of nationally defined 
solidarity groups. 91 Such participation has contributed to the 
emergence of intra-group solidarity between immigrants,  
refugees, and citizens  within trade unions, as professional 
collaboration was found to  provide opportunities for the latter 
to develop personal and professional links with new arrivals  
which trumped existing national solidarities .92  
The importance and impact of recognising refugees as 
individuals with whom important similarities may be shared, 
rather than as abstract, anonymous, and distant “others” can  also 
be demonstrated with recent events in the ongoing European 
Refugee Crisis. In 2015, approximately 4000 people drowned 
                                                 
91 Burgoon, B. et al. (2010). Immigration and the Transformation of American Unionism. 
The International Migration Review. 44(4). pp. 935, 968; Eckenwiler, L. Straehle, C. & 
Chung, R. (2012) “Global Solidarity, Migration And Global Health Inequity,” Bioethics 
26(7). P.387. 
92 Eckenwiler, Straehle & Chung. Op. cit. note 94. P.387. I am grateful to an anonymous 
reviewer for this point. 
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while trying to cross the Mediterranean into Europe .93 While 
these deaths were not ignored, responses to them were largely 
muted at  the international level. However,  shocking images of 
the dead body of Alan Kurdi, a three year old boy fleeing the 
Syrian civil  war with his family,  drew increased attention to the 
plight of refugees in the Mediterranean ,94 and led to significant 
increase of both donations to organisations working to provide 
aid to refugees, and cri ticism of national failures to adequately 
respond to the crisis. 95  
In part , this increase in support for refugees can arguably be 
attributed to an increased awareness amongst the residents of 
wealthy countries, that the European Refugee Crisis involved 
identifiable,  and identified, people  with whom the citizens of 
                                                 
93 BBC News. (2016). Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts BBC 
News. Retrieved  September 15, 2016 from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
34131911. [Last accessed May 29, 2016]. 
94 Regencia, T. & Chughtai, A. (2016). Alan Kurdi: What Has Changed Since His Death? Al-
Jazeera. Retrieved September 25, 2016 from:  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/alan-kurdi-changed-death-
160831173922096.html. [Last accessed 30 Sep 2016]. 
95
 Henley, J. et al. (2015). Britons rally to help people fleeing war and terror in Middle East. 
The Guardian. Retrieved September 25, 2016 from: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/sep/03/britons-rally-to-help-people-fleeing-war-and-terror-in-middle-east. [Last 
accessed 30 Sep 2016]. 
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European countries could identify solidaristically, rather than 
abstract statistics. 96 However,  i t  must be noted that  one year 
after the death of Alan Kurdi, as media and public attention has 
moved to other concerns, the factors which expose refugees to 
serious risk of harm remain largely unaddressed. 97 The point 
remains however that  when awareness of the suffering of distant 
persons is forced into the public consciousness, in terms of the 
suffering of identifiable persons  with whom we share important 
similarities rather than as abstract stat istics, thos e in position to 
                                                 
96 For a further illustration of the impact of individual recognition of refugees see (Boseley, 
S. (2017) Efi Latsoudi: In Solidarity with Refugees. The Lancet 389(10074), 1093). The 
subject of this piece emphasises the importance of solidarity with refugees, and is presented 
as feeling solidarity with them as a result of her family experience of fleeing persecution – a 
similarity she shares with those she helps. See also (Benhabib, S. (1986) The Generalized 
and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory. Praxis 
International 5(4), 402–24; Chinchilla, N. S., Hamilton, N. & Loucky, J. (2009) The 
Sanctuary Movement and Central American Activism in Los Angeles. Latin American 
Perspectives 36(6), 101–26). Correlatively, recent studies have shown widespread support 
for granting refugees residency in many wealthy countries (Maltz, G. & Malknecht, A. (2017, 
May 22). Some Good News About Public Attitudes to Refugees. News Deeply: Refugees 
Deeply. Retrieved June 30, 2017 from:   
https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/05/22/some-good-news-about-
public-attitudes-to-refugees. [Last Accessed June 30, 2017]). 
97 Regencia & Chughtai, op. cit., note 97.  
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help often (though not always)  respond in solidarity with those 
persons.   
6. CONCLUSION 
My aim in this paper has been twofold; first, to show in general 
terms how solidarity between migrants and refugees, and the 
citizens of wealthy countr ies could be derived from the parochial  
interests of wealthy countries and their citizens . Second, to 
explain how this solidarity can shape an effective discourse to 
motivate action to promote and protect  refugee and migrant 
health. To achieve this goal , I outlined two arguments for the 
provision of certain kinds of health care to resident refugees and 
migrants,  each derived from a focus on the interests of 
destination countries  and their cit izens. Having done so,  I noted 
that  while self-interested justifications for the provision of 
health care to resident migrants and refugees had significant 
force in certain contexts, they are limited in scope, and risk 
being interpreted as providing a justification to deny refugees 
and migrants residency and access to care in wealthy countries.  
Further,  reliance on self -interest  risks stigmatising vulnerable 
people, and tacitly accepting that wealthy countries should 
exclude refugees and migrants if doing so would generate 
greater benefits .  
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Despite these limitations I suggested that the argument from the 
interests of wealthy countries and their citizens can provid e the 
basis for a  discourse based on solidarity which addresses these 
weaknesses.  I argued that  the self-interest  upon which these 
arguments are based, exposes and draws attention to the 
similarities that  exist  between the citizens of wealthy countries ,  
and migrants and refugees .  This recognition of similari ty can, if 
incorporated into public discourse surrounding refugee 
entit lements to health care, act  as an epistemological catalyst 
which raises awareness of the connections that exist between 
refugees and migrants, and the citizens of wealthy countries .  
This can engender solidarity for public and individual health , 
and motivate the citizens of weal thy countries to engage in 
solidarity with those they may previously have ignored  (as in 
the AMR and Alan Kurdi examples) .  
In this way, a discourse based on solidarity,  the cooperative,  
egalitarian precursor to justice, 98 can emerge from arguments 
based on self interest,  and motivate action for migrant and 
refugee health through emphasising recognition of the common 
vulnerabilities and interests that the citizens of destination 
countries share with those they may previously have ignored.  
                                                 
98 Krishnamurthy, op. cit., note 73: 133; Scholz, op. cit., note 73: 78. 
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